

CATEGORIES

[PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS]

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If things have only a name in common, and the account of the essence, corresponding to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Both a man and a painted animal, for instance, are animals homonymously; for these have only a name in common and the account (corresponding to the name) of the essence, is different. For if one says what being an animal is for each of them, one will give a different account in each case.

If things have both the name in common and the same account (corresponding to the name) of the essence, they are called synonymous. Both a man and an ox, for instance, are animals <synonymously>, since each is called animal by a common name, and the account of the essence, is the same. For if one gives an account of each, saying what being an animal is for each of them, one will give the same account.

If things are called what they are by having a name that is derived from something else, but with a different inflection, they are called paronymous; for example, the grammarian is so called from grammar, and the brave person from bravery.

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Among things said, some involve combination, while others are without combination. Things involving combination are, for instance, man runs, man wins; things without combination are, for instance, man, ox, run, wins.

Among beings¹ some are said of a subject but are not in any subject; man, for instance, is said of a subject, an individual man, but is not in any subject. Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By 'in a subject' I mean what belongs in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, an individual <instance of> grammatical knowledge is

1. beings (onta): Or 'things that there are' or 'existing things'.

in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and an individual <instance of> white is in a subject, the body (for all color is in body), but is not said of any subject. Some things are both said of a subject and in a subject; knowledge, for instance, is in a subject, the soul, and is said of a subject, grammatical knowledge. Some things are neither in a subject nor said of a subject. This is true, for instance, of an individual man or horse; for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject.

Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject. But nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject; for an individual <instance of> grammatical knowledge is one of the things in a subject.

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10 Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything said of what is predicated is also said of the subject. Man, for instance, is predicated of an individual man, and animal of man; and so animal will also be predicated of an individual man, since an individual man is both a man and an animal.

15 Genera which are different and not subordinate to one another have differentiae that are different in species—for instance, the differentiae of animal and of knowledge. For footed, winged, aquatic, and biped are differentiae of animal, but none of them is a differentia of knowledge; for one sort of knowledge is not differentiated from another by being biped. But if one genus is subordinate to another, nothing prevents them from having the same differentiae; for the higher genera are predicated of those below them, so that the subject will also have all the differentiae of the thing predicated.

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25 Of things said without combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or quality or relative or where or when or being in a position or having or acting on or being affected. To describe these in outline, here are some examples:

Substance:	man, horse
Quantity:	two feet long, three feet long
Quality:	white, grammatical

Relative:	double, half, larger	
Where:	in the Lyceum, in the marketplace	2a
When:	yesterday, last year	
Being in a position:	is lying, is sitting	
Having:	has shoes on, has armor on	
Acting on:	cutting, burning	
Being affected:	being cut, being burned	

None of the things just mentioned is said all by itself in any affirmation; an affirmation results from the combination of these things with one another. For every affirmation seems to be either true or false, whereas nothing said without combination—for instance, man, white, runs, wins—is either true or false.

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[SUBSTANCE]

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What is called substance most fully, primarily, and most of all, is what is neither said of any subject nor in any subject—for instance, an individual man or horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances belong are called secondary substances, and so are their genera. An individual man, for instance, belongs in the species man, and animal is the genus of the species; these things, then (for instance, man and animal), are called secondary substances.

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It is evident from what has been said that if something is said of a subject, then both its name and its account must be predicated of the subject. For instance, man is said of a subject, an individual man, and the name is predicated (since you will predicate man of an individual man); moreover, the account of man will also be predicated of an individual man (since an individual man is also a man). And so both the name and the account will be predicated of the subject.

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On the other hand, if something is in a subject, in most cases neither its name nor its account is predicated of the subject. In some cases the name may well be predicated of the subject, but the account still cannot be predicated. White, for instance, is in a subject, body, and is predicated of the subject (for body is said to be white); but the account of white is never predicated of body.

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All other things are either said of the primary substances as

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subjects or in them as subjects. This is evident if we examine particular cases. Animal, for instance, is predicated of man, and so also of an individual man; for if it is not predicated of any individual man, neither is it predicated of man at all. Again, color is in body, and so also in an individual body; for if it is not in any of the particular bodies, neither is it in body at all.

Hence all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. If, then, the primary substances did not exist, neither could any of the other things exist. For all the other things are either said of these as subjects or are in these as subjects, so that if the primary substances did not exist, neither could any of the other things exist.

Among secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance; for if someone says what the primary substance is, it will be more informative and more appropriate if he mentions the species than if he mentions the genus. It will be more informative, for instance, to say that an individual man is a man than to say that he is an animal, since man is more distinctive of an individual man, while animal is more common; and it will be more informative to say that an individual tree is a tree than that it is a plant.

Further, the primary substances are subjects for all the other things, and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them; this is why they, most of all, are called substances. But as the primary substances are related to other things, so also is the species related to the genus; for the species is a subject for the genus, since the genera are predicated of the species, whereas the species are not reciprocally predicated of the genera. And so for this reason too the species is more a substance than the genus.

Among species that are not themselves genera, however, one is no more a substance than another; for it is no more appropriate to say that an individual man is a man than it is to say that an individual horse is a horse. And, similarly, among primary substances one is no more a substance than another; for an individual man is no more a substance than an individual ox is.

It is not surprising that, after the primary substances, only their species and genera are said to be secondary substances; for they are the only things predicated that reveal the primary substance. For if one says what an individual man is, it will be appropriate to mention the species or the genus, though it will be more informative to mention man than animal. But it would be inappropriate

to mention anything else—for instance, white or runs or any other such thing. It is not surprising, then, that species and genera are the only other things said to be substances.

Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are said to be substances most fully. But as the primary substances are related to everything else, so also the species and genera of primary substances are related to all the other <species and genera>; for all the others are predicated of them. For you will call an individual man grammatical, and so you will call both man and animal grammatical; and the same is true in the other cases.

A feature common to every substance is not being in a subject; for a primary substance is neither said of nor in a subject. In the same way, it is evident that secondary substances are not in a subject either; for man is said of a subject—an individual man—but is not in a subject, since man is not in an individual man. Similarly, animal is said of a subject—an individual man—but animal is not in an individual man.

Further, while things in a subject may sometimes have their name predicated of the subject, their account can never be predicated of it. Secondary substances, on the other hand, have both their account and their name predicated of the subject; for you will predicate both the account of man and the account of animal of an individual man. Hence no substance is in a subject.

This, however, is not distinctive of substance. The differentia is not in a subject either; for footed and biped are said of a subject—man—but are not in a subject, since neither footed nor biped is in man. Again, the account of the differentia is predicated of whatever subject the differentia is said of; for instance, if footed is said of man, the account of footed will also be predicated of man, since man is footed.

We need not be worried that we will ever be compelled to say that the parts of substances, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we spoke of things in a subject, we did not mean things belonging in something as parts.

It is a feature of substances and differentiae that everything called from them is so called synonymously; for all the predications from these are predicated of either the individuals or the species. (For there is no predication from a primary substance—since it is not said of any subject—and among secondary sub-

stances the species is predicated of an individual, and the genus is predicated both of the species and of an individual. Similarly, differentiae are also predicated both of the species and of the individuals.) Now the primary substances receive the account both of the species and of the genera, and the species receives the account of the genus; for whatever is said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. Similarly, both the species and the individuals receive the account of the differentiae; and we saw that synonymous things are those that both have the name in common and also have the same account. Hence everything called from substances and differentiae is so called synonymously.

Every substance seems to signify a this. In the case of primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a this; for what is revealed is an individual and is numerically one. In the case of secondary substances, it appears from the character of the name, whenever one speaks of man or animal, that they also signify a this. But this is not true. Rather, each signifies a sort of thing;² for the subject is not one, as the primary substance is, but man and animal are said of many things. On the other hand, it does not unqualifiedly signify a sort of thing, as white does. For white signifies nothing other than a sort of thing, whereas the species and the genus demarcate a sort of substance; for they signify a substance of a certain sort. One demarcates more with the genus than with the species; for in speaking of animal one encompasses more than in speaking of man.

It is also a feature of substances that nothing is contrary to them. For what could be contrary to a primary substance? Nothing is contrary, for instance, to an individual man; nor is anything contrary to man or animal. This is not distinctive of substance, however, but is also true of many other things—of quantity, for instance, since nothing is contrary to two feet long, nor to ten, nor to anything else of this kind. One might say that many is contrary to few, or large to small; but no definite quantity is contrary to any other.

Substance does not seem to admit of more or less. By this I do not mean that one substance is no more a substance than another; for we have said that one type of substance is more a substance

2. **a sort of thing:** *poion ti*. In the rest of this paragraph (and elsewhere; see QUALITY) Aristotle uses *poion* to refer both to secondary substance and to the category of quality.

than another. Rather, I mean that no substance is said to be more or less what it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more or less a man either than itself or than another. For one man is no more a man than another, in the way that one white thing is whiter than another, or one beautiful thing is more beautiful than another. In some cases a thing is called more or less something than itself—for example, the body which is white is said to be more white now than it was before, and the body which is hot is said to be more or less hot <than it was>. But substance is not spoken of in this way; for a man is not said to be more a man now than before, nor is this said of any other substance. Thus substance does not admit of more or less.

It seems most distinctive of substance that numerically one and the same thing is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one cite something numerically one that is able to receive contraries. For example, the color that is numerically one and the same will not be pale and dark, nor will the action that is numerically one and the same be bad and good, and the same is true of anything else that is not a substance. But a substance that is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. An individual man, for instance, being one and the same, becomes at one time pale, at another time dark, and hot and cold, and bad and good; nothing of this sort appears in any other case.

Someone might object, however, that statements and beliefs are like this, since the same statement seems to be both true and false. If, for instance, the statement that someone is seated is true, when he has stood up this same statement will be false. The same is true of belief; for if someone were to believe truly that someone is seated, he will believe falsely if he has the same belief about the same person when he has stood up.

But even if one were to accept this, the way in which these receive contraries is still different. For in the case of substances, a thing is able to receive contraries by itself changing; for it changed when it became cold from hot (since it altered), or dark from pale, or good from bad, and similarly in the other cases it is able to receive contraries by itself changing. But statements and beliefs themselves remain completely unchanged in every way; it is because the object <they are about> changes that the contrary comes to be about them. For the statement that someone is seated remains the same, but it comes to be true at one time, false at another time, when the object has changed. The same is true of

belief. Hence at least the way in which substance is able to receive contraries—by a change in itself—is distinctive of it, if indeed one were to accept it as true that beliefs and statements are also able to receive contraries.

In fact, however, this is not true. For a statement and a belief are said to be able to receive contraries not because they themselves receive something, but because something else has been affected. For it is because the object is or is not some way that the statement is said to be true or false, not because the statement itself is able to receive contraries; for, without exception, no statement or belief is changed by anything. And so, since nothing comes to be in them, they are not able to receive contraries. But substance is said to be able to receive contraries, because it receives them itself. For it receives sickness and health, or paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives each thing of this sort, it is said to be able to receive contraries.

Hence it is distinctive of substance that numerically one and the same thing is able to receive contraries. So much, then, about substance.

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